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Act of Recognition is the matter regulated by international 
law. After declaration of independence, Kosovo’s path toward 
EU integration is going to be problematic for Kosovo 
institutions and challenging for EU foreign policy. Even 
though Kosovo was recognized by major international actors 
as sui generis case, some of them see this case as precedent and 
harmful for supposed developments within their jurisdictions, 
especially by 5 EU not recognizing countries. The article aims 
to justify the proclamation of independence by Kosovo 
institutions and to analyze the possible negative effects 
deriving from non-recognition policy for Kosovo and its new 
fragile democracy, hampering the democratic peace. The policy 
of minor EU member states, contesting Kosovo’s statehood 
based on the assumption that the act of recognition will open a 
dangerous path for secession-minded national minorities in 
their own countries, taking into account that through 
(non)recognition, states attempt to continue or change the 
existing order at international relations. Postponing Kosovo’s 
recognition by the rest of EU members will accumulate 
negative potentials within the new state, with possible 
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The ethnocentric Serbian official policy continuously ignored the idea of 
providing Kosovo an equal political status within the ex-Yugoslav 
Federation. In contrary, powers of 1974 Kosovo’s autonomy were 
dismantled, physical and structural violence against its population 
increased, triggering a gradual dissociation from Serbia and evolution 
towards an independent Albanian entity. Insufficient patience by 
international community toward peaceful approach applied for ten years 
by the Kosovo population, redirected the society to an extreme approach - 
the armed Liberation War. Eight years after the war, Kosovo declared 
independence from Serbia. After the act of declaration, Kosovo’s path 
toward EU, considering the actual level of recognitions, is going to be 
problematic for Kosovo and a tough challenge for EU foreign policy. 
Although Kosovo was recognized by major international actors as sui 
generis case, some of them see this case as precedent and harmful for 
supposed developments within their jurisdictions, especially by 5 EU not 
recognizing countries. “Independence for Kosovo has done little to clarify 
the very ambiguous legal process of recognition and constitutes a unique 
constellation of factors which militate against emulation. Fears that Kosovo 
would have a domino effect are thus misplaced to the extent that states, 
such as Spain, Russia and China, which currently harbor disgruntled 
minorities, are highly unlikely to ever have to counter Western support for 
the secession of one of these regions” (Hehir, 2009). 
 
2. The same International Law-differently interpreted on Kosovo’s 
Recognition 
 
Recognition, “respect for the equal dignity of autonomous beings” 
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013), is an institution of State 
practice that resolves unpredictability related to status of newly created 
international actor. Recognition as a unilateral act or practice by the states 
has both a normative (equality) and a psychological (feedback) dimension 
for relations between recognizer and recognized. “The question is whether 
the denial of recognition to an entity otherwise qualifying as a state entitles 
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the non-recognizing state to act as if it was not a state-to ignore its 
nationality, to intervene in its affairs, generally to deny the exercise of state 
rights under international law. The answer must be no, and the categorical 
constitutive position, which implies a different answer, is unacceptable.” 
(Crawford, 2010, p. 27). “A state conducts its relations with another state in 
coherency with systemic order, in accordance with other states, and, 
sometimes contrary to existing order. In practice a strong presumption 
favors the continuity and disfavors the extinction of an established state” 
(Crawford, 2006, 701). The Montevideo Convention of 1933 states that “the 
political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other 
states.” About one hundred twenty new countries were created and 
recognized by other states since the end of World War II, most of them as 
result of process of decolonization, in accordance with Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960. The 
issue of creation the new states is a matter of fact and not of individual state 
political will, and their recognition “… require different legal criteria and 
different legal results” (Worster, 2009, p. 116). On the issue of recognition 
and the legal effects of recognition, of state existence or not, are developed 
two most debatable theories. According to the older one, constitutive 
theory, a state exists exclusively via recognition by others states. To the 
declaratory school of thought, recognition is acknowledgement of the 
existing statehood status, and that the act of recognition does not confer 
status (Worster, 2009, p. 118). Declaratory theory, developed on 
shortcomings of older one, holds that the entity exists as a state before 
recognition, it means that before the act of recognition, recognized state 
must enjoy an international personality.1 
Declaratory theory, prioritizing the “fact” of existence, consist of four 
empirical criteria as stated in the 1933 Montevideo Convention, while 
Constitutive theory prioritize the “law” criterion of state existence. 
According to the declaratory theory, recognition of a new state is a political 
act, which is, in principle, “independent of the existence of the new state as 
a subject of international law” (Crawford, 2010, 22). Debates over nature of 
recognition did not produce clear conclusion whether it is in accordance 
with constitutive or declaratory theory; however, most of the researchers 
                                                 
1 See Sloane D.R. 2002. The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case 
Study of Tibet, 16 Emory International Law Review 107, 117; Brierly L.J. 1963. The Law of 
Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace at Humphrey Waldock 6th ed.  
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give priority to that of declaratory. “States, in the forum of the United 
Nations or elsewhere, may make declarations as to status or ‘recognize’ 
entities the status of which is doubtful: depending on the degree of 
unanimity and other factors this may be evidence of a compelling kind” 
(Crawford, 2010, p. 27). Wilde distinguishes two related law aspects to 
recognition process: a state is or is not a state because, among other things, 
other states have decided to treat it as such; and, the recognition itself is 
regulated by international law, in the sense that states are sometimes 
constrained in their choices when comes to recognition (Wilde, 2010, p. 2). 
There is no doubt that statehood itself is independent of recognition. 
International Law does not say that a State is not in existence as long as it is 
not recognized, but it takes no notice of it before its recognition.  
After the period of recognition of “Third World” countries, post-Cold 
War practice included new criteria for statehood. To the process of 
recognizing the new states, except population, territory, government, and 
capacity to enter into relations with other states, attached are new 
principles such as respect for human rights, democracy, commitment to 
disarm, and peace-loving. Kosovo, with limited internal sovereignty is 
recognized by major world states; by 3 of 5 Security Council permanent 
members; by 23 of 28 EU member states, recognized by three of four its 
neighbors; is in good way to conclude the demarcation of the territory, did 
not complete yet full international personality as a result of non-
recognizing states policy. Kosovo’s statehood and prosperity claimed in 
accordance with independence declaration, is hostage of “(non) recognition 
war” by minor representing states at Security Council and at European 
Union. Refusing to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty, the new state could 
have further consequences “because without international legal 
personality, that entity would lack many of the important protections 
granted to states by international law” (Eckert, p. 2002, p. 24). Why the 
same issue, in this case Kosovo, is differently accepted by the states 
absolute political discretion, if there is the same international law 
applicable? It is because of different approaches toward international law 
adopted for inner or shared group states interests. Facts’ stipulated in this 
article, try to argue in favor of recognizing Kosovo’s full international legal 
personality by all states and possible derived consequences by non-
recognizing policies for Kosovo and the region. Kosovo’s internal 
challenges, related to rule of law, can be easy improved in case of 
recognitions by all EU members and followed also by inclusions in 
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international organizations. Inclusion, not only declaratory and constitutive 
school of thoughts, but also the elements of humanitarianism in state 
justifications of eventual acts of recognizing will contribute in reconciliation 
of existing antagonisms on this issue. 
 
3. Complexity of Kosovo independence 
 
Obtaining Kosovo's independence was a complex political process heavily 
influenced by Serbia's atrocities against majority in Kosovo, the Albanian 
peaceful and, later on, by armed endeavors, the international humanitarian 
intervention and state-building efforts by both, locals and internationals. The 
unique circumstances in Kosovo’s case require a unique international 
behavior without affecting the outcome of other international disputes.  
Kosovo responded against Serbia’s violent nationalist acts during the 90s 
initially with a gradual dissociation from Serbia, and later by setting-up 
peaceful self-sustaining institutions, which lasted for almost ten years. Since 
the beginning of negotiations - from the Carrington process to the Dayton 
agreement - the Kosovo issue was excluded in order to make Serbia willing 
to participate in the process (Weller, 2008, p. 5-95). The intervention of the 
international community was focused on the war arenas in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only after the Dayton Peace Accords, did the issue 
of Kosovo start featuring on their agenda, categorized as a case of human 
rights violations. In parallel, with their peaceful strategy and after 
understanding that “if lacking the guns”, the internationals could not be 
engaged in solving the situation, the Kosovo Albanians became radicalized. 
The Serbian policy of extreme aggressiveness against everything that was 
Albanian stimulated the growth of radicalism within the Albanian 
population, shifting their peaceful attitude towards armed resistance as the 
last resort for surviving2. International attention on the Kosovo issue 
                                                 
2 During the 80s Serbian regimes applied a policy of creating the conditions for changing the 
former Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, according to which Kosovo was a constitutional part 
of the Federation. After the abrogation of the Constitution of Kosovo, Milosevic’s policy of 
physical and structural violence against Kosovo Albanians culminated with genocidal acts 
of ethnic cleansing, massive killings, raping, in order to change the ethnic structure in 
Kosovo. Under Yugoslav-Serbian regimes, the Albanian population suffered all forms of 
abuse. After WWII, Albanians spent 666.7 centuries of prison for political reasons; around 
12.000 people were killed during 1998-2000; more than 800.000 people were expelled from 
their homes during the war and around 20.000 women were raped (See more at: Keçmezi-
Basha 2009; Malcolm 1999; Mertus, 1999). 
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culminated only after a number of massacres occurred in Kosovo3. That also 
raised the Albanians’ awareness of their inherent right to freedom from 
Serbia and settling the democracy which had lacked for a long time on this 
territory. The international humanitarian intervention – a lesson learned by 
results of prior Serbian behavior toward Croatia and Bosnia, the daily violent 
events in Kosovo and the lack of an agreement at Rambouillet – was a "sui 
generis" in the practice of international relations, “illegal but legitimate”, 
saved the Kosovo Albanian population from extinction, necessity from the 
ethical and humanitarian perspective. As Oppenheim stated, ”...it cannot be 
denied that public opinion and the attitude of the Powers are in favor of such 
interventions, and it may perhaps be said that in time the Law of Nations 
will recognize the rule that interventions in the interests of humanity are 
admissible provided they are exercised in the form of a collective 
intervention of the Powers” (Oppenheim, 1912, p. 195-196). 
Three main developments parts of Kosovo’s path toward recognition 
should be taken into consideration by non- recognizers: Kosovo’s Earned 
Sovereignty, the opinion of The International Court of Justice, and The 
Agreement on Normalization of the Relations with Serbia. Alternatives of 
independence cannot prevent harmful outcomes to peacebuilding 
processes started at the beginning of the new millennia in Kosovo and the 
region. “As recognition for Kosovo steadily grows, so does implied 
acceptance of the distinguishing factors of its independence: concerted 
international involvement; an internationally-drafted plan for 
independence with extensive protections for minority Serbs; and most 
importantly, the fact that there simply was no viable alternative to 
independence.” (Joseph, 2013, p. 1). 
 
                                                 
3 Massacres before the NATO intervention: Likoshane massacre, February 28, 1998, 14 
members of the Ahmeti family; February 28 and March 1, 1998, the Sejdiu family killed; 
Prekaz massacre, March 5, 1998,  Yugoslav forces killed Adem Jashari, KLA 
Commander and 45 members of his family; Obri e Epërme massacre, September 28, 1998, 
Special Forces entered the village and executed 21 members of the Delijaj family; Reqak 
massacre, January 15, 1999, a Serb Special Anti-Terrorist Unit killed 45 people in village 
Reqak; Rogovo massacre, January 29, 1999, Serb police-officers executed 24 Albanians. 
During the NATO humanitarian intervention, Serbian military, police and paramilitary 
forces killed thousands of Albanians. At the time of NATO intervention massacres were 
bloodiest, as that of Meja, 27 April 1999, in which Serbian army and paramilitary killed 377 
Albanians.  
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4. Non-recognition policy by the 5 EU countries - Challenge to 
Integration/Peace-Building processes in Kosovo  
 
In the context of foreign policy, national policies of member states 
overlap or replace those of EU. On the policies such as trade, free 
movement, or labor, member countries are willing to give up sovereignty, 
but not to those of sensitive areas such as the issue of recognizing of the 
new states or of national security, giving veto power to each EU member. 
This EU choice is sign of differences among organization constituents, 
making EU organization less pragmatic than are the US.  
Lauterpacht, embraced the constitutive theory in the sense that the new 
state did not exist until recognized, but he also insisted on the declaratory 
theory in the sense that existing states did not have discretion to refuse to 
recognize a new state (Worster, 2009, p. 123). “There is no rule of 
international law which forbids secession from an existing state; nor is 
there any rule which forbids the mother state from crushing the 
secessionary movements if it can. Whatever the outcome of the struggle, it 
will be accepted as legal in the eyes of international law.” (Malanczuk, 
2006, p. 79). “We all have in mind to bring the direct and concrete benefits 
to all people in Serbia and in Kosovo who wish to advance on their 
European path”, said Mogherini, following the last EU- facilitated Kosovo-
Serbia dialogue (Mogherini, 2016). Such direct and concrete benefits are set 
up in the recently signed the Stabilization Association Agreement, SAA, as 
“a milestone in EU-Kosovo relations and of critical importance for the 
future of Kosovo and the Western Balkans” (Hahn, 2016), helping Kosovo 
to create legal framework toward gradual approximation with EU laws and 
standards. The EU was the major contributor to postwar Kosovo 
institution-building, state-building and economic recovery. “The EU will 
continue to support Kosovo's socio-economic development as part of its 
European reform agenda, including through financial and technical 
assistance”(Council Conclusions, 2015). On the other hand, there is a kind 
of paradox as the EU offers integration perspectives but at the same time 
creates obstacles with non-recognizing policy by 5 EU members. EU foreign 
policy toward Kosovo independence was un-harmonized, with 
ambiguities, and appears to be merely obstructive on Kosovo’s path 
towards EU integration, excluding promises coming from EU forums of 
open doors. Since 1999 the U.S.”delegated” to the EU the responsibility for 
the developments in Kosovo and the future of the whole region on its path 
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to EU integration, which came to limit U.S. aid to 15% of the total amount 
pledged by all countries for reconstruction in Kosovo4, but with strong 
political and moral influence in the region, especially in Kosovo case. 
  
5. Hesitation by 5 EU member countries-confuse common EU foreign 
policy  
 
History shows that secession and unilateral declarations of 
independence have been methods of creating the new States and are not 
contrary to the international law. Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina did the same in the region. This practice was used in the 
Kosovo case and affirmed by the opinion of the ICJ in 2010. Kosovo, 
however, began the new era of establishing sustainable peace and searched 
for reconciliation with Serbia, despite the fact that the state of Serbia started 
four wars in the end of last millennium. The inter-ethnic relations in 
Kosovo, as a precondition for EU integration became more relaxed, and the 
predicted “doom for the majority of Serbs who now live under Albanian 
majority rule in the south of Kosovo” did not materialized (Joseph, 2013, p. 
1).  
Non-recognized state stance on the Kosovo issue, especially that of 
Spain, followed by Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia is mainly due to 
concerns about the implications for their own domestic politic agenda and 
possible ethnic secessionist challenges, and not because of the antagonism 
with international law, which was their main policy argument for non-
recognition. All of them have strong minorities within their own borders 
and fear they might seek independence. A shared history with Serbia of 
resistance against the Ottoman Empire5, fear of materializing the Great 
                                                 
4 The June and November 1999 donors’ conferences for Kosovo, almost entirely focusing on 
reconstruction and development concerns, raised $1.5 billion in pledges. One issue for 
Congress is the level of aid to be provided and the proportionality of U.S. assistance vis-a-
vis European donors. Both the FY2000 and FY2001 appropriations limited U.S. 
contributions to 15% of the total (P.L. 106-429 on November 6) as a sign that the US 
“delegated” the responsibility for Kosovo to the EU (Tarnoff 2001).  
5 Even such an argument is not binding as Islamic countries did not recognize Kosovo. 
Perceptions by some of non-recognizer countries that the chosen policy is in line with a 
shared history of resistance against (mostly Ottoman) invaders, as defenders of 
Christianity and the West is wrong, because Gjergj Kastrioti-Scanderbeg, the most popular 
Albanian hero, was among the first to fight against the Ottomans. Not only Romanians, 
Slovaks, Greeks “are acutely aware of their kinship with Serbs through religion, traditions 
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Albania, or to some extent relying at individual sympathies serving as 
diplomats in Belgrade could not be the policy of EU non-recognizing 
countries. The fear that Kosovo’s independence might be used as a 
precedent should be inexistent for them, as the Kosovo case is qualified as 
sui generis and cannot be applied to others. Chancellor Angela Merkel 
described Kosovo as "sui generis" - an isolated case not comparable to 
separatist movements in other countries” (News 24, 2008). “I don’t want to 
try to judge the motives, but we’ve been very clear that Kosovo is sui 
generis and that is because of the special circumstances out of which the 
breakup of Yugoslavia came. The special circumstances of the aggression 
of the Milosevic forces against Kosovars, particularly Albanian Kosovars, 
and it’s a special circumstance”, stated the US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice in 2008 (Civil. Ge, 2008). The analogical sentence is 
reused in the Council of the European Union document called Council 
Conclusions on Kosovo: in view of the conflict of 1999 and the extended 
period of international administration under Security Council Resolution 
1244, Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case which does not call into 
question these principles and resolutions (Council of the EU, 2008). The 
same statement was declared by the German Foreign Minister, Mr. 
Westerwelle, stressing that “Kosovo was an individual case, under specific 
historical conditions, and that no precedent had been set”. Divisions on 
Kosovo issue within UN SC member states influenced the same to the 
European Union, forcing to leave it up to each member state to decide 
whether to recognize Kosovo's independence. 
The recognition by more than half of the world’s countries and Western 
democracies, the establishment of democracy, membership of international 
and regional organization within only eight years of existence appear as 
successful outcomes when compared to other secessionist cases such as 
those of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, South Ossetia, or even the Palestinian case, recently recognized by 
the Vatican.  
Why remaining five states took contrary position of that of 23 EU 
members? Are majority of EU states breaching international order? Have 
they settled to being the guardians of international law through non - 
recognition of Kosovo as a state? Or, is there a mistake done by Kosovo 
                                                                                                                            
and history” (Popescu, 2011), but also the Albanians share the same religion, traditions and 
history of being occupied, except for the fact that they are not Slavs (like the Serbs). 
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politicians that they misperceived the role of some small EU countries on 
their readiness to follow the decisions of EU main powers and US, not 
outreaching them diplomatically? How it is that NATO members, 
participating in bombing campaign against Serbia, did not recognize 
Kosovo independence?  
Spain’s participation in the Balkans has been in line with the general 
framework of the international community’s intervention for maintenance 
of peace. Spain has also participated actively in peace operations in Kosovo 
for ten years, after the NATO intervention. Spain had a military personnel 
with 600-800 soldiers deployed in Kosovo, but lacking to present 
diplomatically. Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos stated on 18th February 
2008 that "the Spanish government will not recognize the unilateral act 
proclaimed yesterday by the Kosovar assembly, and it will not recognize it 
because we do not believe it respects international legality... The Spanish 
government has always defended respect for international legality. It 
defended it when it decided to withdraw troops from Iraq, and it defends it 
again now when talking about the secession of a state... If you examine the 
nations who are against this recognition, they are the countries that know 
best and are the most similar to the West Balkans." (Global Security). When 
Russian leader Putin accused EU for application of double standards 
related to Kosovo and Spain where “people do not want to live under the 
same state”, Spain Vice-president, de la Vega, replied that the situation “is 
no way comparable to that of Spain”, recognizing the different 
circumstances (i Fanes 2011: 11). According to Spain officials, Kosovo’s 
independence would be legal if brought about by a new UNSCR or by a 
negotiated agreement between the parties, and that Spain wished to 
uphold the international principle of territorial integrity (Global Security 
org.). The distinguishing factors between Spain and recognizer countries 
are domestic politics, including the existence of secessionist challenges 
faced by Spain and the proximity of a particularly tight election contest, 
commitment to international law, Europeanism, and a certain distance 
from everyday events in the Balkans (Fanes, 2011, p. 13). But, not all in 
Spain share official fillings or considers the Kosovo case differently than 
that official one, as are nationalist parties in the Basque and Catalonia 
which with sympathies look at Kosovo independence. Professor of 
international law at the University of Barcelona, Jaume Saura recognizes 
that "Catalonia and the Basque Country are completely different cases to 
Kosovo.  
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Official Slovak policy, declared back in February 2008, doesn’t recognize 
the independence of Kosovo. This policy course has not changed even after 
opinion by The International Court of Justice in the Hague on 22 July 2010, 
according to which the declaration of independence of Kosovo was not in 
breach of international law. “The position of Slovak Republic is based upon 
the declaration of the Parliament of Slovak Republic from 28 March 2007. 
Slovak Republic believes that the principle of territorial integrity of the 
state forms the basic principle of international law, on which international 
community is built and operates according to˝ (Slovak Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2010). The only parliamentary party supported Kosovo’s 
independence in February 2008 was that of Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia. Within Slovakian opinion is spread lurking filing that Hungarian 
minority living in the south is threat to state interests, as they still plan to 
break away and become part of Hungary. This minority makes up at least 
10% of the total population of Slovakia, with some areas in the south of 
Slovakia that have more than 40% of their population who are of 
Hungarian ethnicity. Elected President of Slovakia, 2014, Andrej Kiska 
believes, contrary to his predecessor Robert Fico that his country should 
change direction and recognize the independence of Kosovo (De Gauna, 
2014).  
According to official Romanian un-recognizer stance to Kosovo 
independence, there are two main reasons behind, Kosovo within 
Romanian foreign policy and Romania’s domestic political situation, linked 
with the internal and external interest of the state (Popescu, 2011, p. 53), as 
shared history of resistance against invaders, shared orthodox religion, 
sympathy towards the Serbs, relatively friendly border relations with 
Serbia comparing with other neighbors… Fear that 1.3 million (census 
2011) Hungarians concentrated in Transylvania will take the same path as 
Albanians in Kosovo is determining Romanian not-recognition policy. The 
same policy followed also after the ICJ delivered its opinion on regularity 
of independence declaration, against which Romanian foreign policy was 
engaged during testimony at the ICJ.  
Greece opinion on Kosovo developments even during the NATO 
campaign was that of negative stereotypes, as it was to US, NATO, the EU, 
contrary to the view toward the Serbs. (Armakolas and Karabairis, 2011, p. 
95). Official position by Greece was complex, between pro Serbian 
populism and possible marginalization from the belonging organizations, 
EU and NATO, in case of being associated with Serbia. In such 
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environment, Greece facilitated and to some degree participated at NATO 
operations, opened air space, ports and other facilitation for military use 
and actively engaged at humanitarian endeavors, including hosting 
refugees. As to other EU non-recognizers, the fear that the same model will 
be applied to the Cyprus, Greece refusal to recognize Kosovo has remained 
intact, but developed significant and constructive relations, including 
diplomatic ones. The interrelated arguments not to recognize an 
independent Kosovo, “can be divided into those that plead for respect of 
international law and those which express concern about setting a 
precedent for other unilateral acts, and the potential implications these 
might have on global security.” (Armakolas and Karabairis, 2011, p. 114). 
Contrary to Greece, Cyprus has neither formal nor informal relations 
with Kosovo, attitude based on political, historical, cultural and economic 
considerations (Kentas, 2011, p. 124). The policy of non-recognition by 
Cyprus of Kosovo is based on the possible implications related to Turkish 
population whom declared independence in 1993 at the northern part of 
the Cyprus Island, although noting that those two issues are different.6 
Remaining states would have to recognize Kosovo in order to avoid 
fragmenting the European and NATO unanimous voice or it would have to 
stand as a dividing factor in a crucial issue for organizations. If divided 
European policy toward recognition of Kosovo continues, the new country 
will suffer achieving EU economic and political standards. Policy of 
keeping close eyes on the Kosovo developments by five EU members will 
exclude most of them from the process of decision making in the Balkans 
region. Dissonant voices weakens EUs approach, makes its efforts in the 
region less effective, represent the democracy deficit within the EU as a 
supranational organization through a nationalization (vetoing) of the 
European politics, instead of the contrary, the Europeanization of national 
politics. Kosovo and regional prosperity should be subjected to minimum 
required standards and not to a higher threshold or barriers. Taking in 
consideration the geopolitical circumstances, UE Foreign Policy should 
accelerate with the policy of integration of the whole Balkan region, 
because of possible implications by Russia. 
                                                 
6 Statement of the Cyprus MFA concerning the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the unilateral 
declaration of independence by Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, 
July 22, 2010.  
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The majority of Kosovo’s people are aware that radical solutions of 
being together with Albania might be provoking new turbulences in the 
region. Kosovo’s society and institutions are working very hard to reach 
high standards for minorities, and every attempt towards unification with 
Albania will be counter effective. In this context, the solution of an 
independent Kosovo is not the best one, but a rational and pragmatic one. 
This is in line with the answers to a survey conducted the by author, who 
asked 442 students from different Kosovo universities about the rational 
options for the future of Kosovo. 66.5% of them were in favor of the 
integration of Kosovo within the EU, rather than for unification with 
Albania, as responded by 22.2% (Dalipi, 2014, p. 12). Recently, ex US 
Ambassador to Albania, C. Hill, stated that “I worked in Albania and later 
when I talked with Kosovo negotiator, I realized one thing better than 
others; Albania did not want to be a country with Kosovo; I realized that 
there were two countries with their own future. I never worry as other 
foreigners on the creation of Greater Albania” (Koha Ditore, 2016). 
The further postponement of the recognition of Kosovo and accession 
process to the Euro-Atlantic organizations will produce a wave of 
discontent among the Kosovo Albanian population. In this case, they will 
try to be accommodated mostly within the Albanian speaking environment 
in the Balkans, as an alternative to EU integration and in good relations 
with other countries. Frequent protests by Kosovo citizens are not only a 
sign of discontent with the government performance, but also with the 
EU’s lack of coherence regarding the Kosovo issue…”efforts to keep 
Kosovo status in balance are a recipe for further instability, stagnation, and 
ethnic divisions in Kosovo and in the region. Only when Kosovo’s 
independence is declared and recognized will the necessary conditions be 
put in place for achieving broader regional stability necessary for progress 
towards the EU accession” (Grgic, B. 2005). 
No state in Europe can survive in isolation, as is Kosovo today. 
Alternatives such as partition or decentralization with any form of decisive 
involvement by the Serbian government within Kosovo will protract and 
not solve the existing disputes. The insistence of EU policy on prioritizing 
Serbia’s ambiguity towards both the East and West contribute to the 
deepening of ethnic cleavages between the Serb and Albanian communities 
in Kosovo. “There is no doubt that enlargement fatigue threatens our 
societies with patience fatigue [...] Albanians are not dreaming of Great 
Albania, but we are dreaming of big Europe that will include all Albanian 
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territories” (Zëri, 2014), said Albanian Prime-Minister Rama during his visit 
in Belgrade, sixty-eight years after the last visit (1946) by ex-Albanian 
leader Enver Hoxha. 
Incidents during the interrupted football match between Serbia and 
Albania (2014), the declaration by the Serbian minister in the Kosovo 
Government referring to missing people’s mothers as “savages” are signs 
of the still existing negative stereotypes among the two peoples and of the 
unfinished task on settling the peace in the region (Reuters, 2015). Peace 
cannot be built on extreme feelings, activities and expressions, but on the 
contrary, through a moderate and tolerant approach to the common future 
by all ethnicities in the region. Continuation of the non-recognition policy is 
going to send a series of possible messages to both Albanian and Serb 
political and religious radicals and to other non-recognizing countries in 
the world, such as:  
 The possibility of returning Kosovo under Serbian rule, stimulating 
ignorance over the existence of Kosovo institutions and the will of the 
majority of its population; 
 The idea that Albanians are not accepted by the Europeans because of 
their main religion, as the Serbian Ambassador Darko Tanaskovic 
called for a “wider Christian front” to oppose Kosovo’s membership 
to UNESCO (Hashim Thaci, UNSC); 
 Kosovo should not be oriented toward the West democracies but 
policies based on Islam to which faith most of the Albanians belong;  
 The idea that the war is not yet finished and they must prepare to 
continue the war for the unification of Kosovo with Albania as the EU 
is not interested in them; and, 
 The different attitude by EU countries toward Kosovo’s independence 
will discourage the hesitant states in the world to decide recognize 
Kosovo’s independence.  
 
While Kosovo is fully determined toward EU integration, other Balkan 
countries policy7, are oscillating. Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
                                                 
7 The participation of high rank politicians from Serbia (President Nikolic), Macedonia 
(President Ivanov) at the anniversary of the end of World War II in Moscow, protests 
against NATO in Belgrade on March 2016, determined pro Russian policy by M. Dodig, 
through Referendum at Republika Srpska… are signs of their uncertain policy toward 
Western democracies. Serbia is an observer at the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) led by the Russian Federation. (http://www.odkb-csto.org/news/detail.php? 
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Macedonia’s foreign policies are two-folds: stretched between their 
intentions to join the EU and thus harmonize their foreign policy with the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union on one hand, 
and on the other, to avoid disruption of existing relations with the Russian 
Federation (Đukanović, 2014). There is a paradox: Kosovo is unequivocally 
a pro-Western and pro-Euro-Atlantic country as recently shown by Kosovo 
government reactions against annexation of Crimea and applying the 
sanctions against Russian Federation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Prishtina, 2014a), but EU is moving slowly in fulfilling the will of kosovars. 
As Gautam wrote “Radicals may play on the sentiment that the West 
simply does not want Kosovo, while highlighting the sense of belonging 
and involvement that comes from participation in ISIL.”(Gautam, 2016). 
For this reason, continued efforts at integration would prove useful in 
thwarting the growth of radicalization and recruitment in Kosovo. The 
policy of stricter standards and additional requirements for Kosovo (not for 
others, such is condition for visa liberalization the border demarcation with 
M. Negro) will produce a certain level of discontent within the majority in 
the country and a growing radicalism. Radicalism among Kosovo 
Albanians and the Serbs will produce a growth of the radical movements in 
the region with interethnic relations and social cohesion deficit, 
destabilizing it, and returning to the situation of the pre-war period. Hence, 
the peace-building efforts and achievements will be affected. Finally, the 
policy of not recognizing Kosovo’s independence by five EU remaining 
countries is not fully beneficial even for the Serbian people and 
policymakers, who will face difficulties in the process of EU integration. On 
the contrary, they will understand that they cannot run alone against 




                                                                                                                            
ELEMENT_ID=1776). Macedonia’s behavior in the name dispute with Greece and its 
internal politics, especially towards the Albanians, who make up around 30% of the 
population, are producing a fragile situation in the Balkans. High rank political positions 
distribution among nationalities in Macedonia and implementation of Ohrid Agreement 
should contribute to sustainable peacebuilding. The constitutional and practical equality of 
Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia are guarantees for the prosperity of the country. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
The final process of secession of Kosovo from Serbia seems to be 
challenging for both countries. The key factors in the achievement of 
Kosovo’s independence were its political coherence and close relationship 
with the West democracies since the end of Cold War, exercise of extreme 
violation acts by Serbia, and both, peaceful and military resistance by 
Kosovo people. After passing the international supervision phase in 
September 2012, Kosovo continues to develop a close cooperation with 
international actors in order to achieve a consolidated / mature statehood. 
As argued in the article, the non-recognition of the new state continues to 
be motivated by internal issues of respective states, interpreting 
international law differently with those whom recognized Kosovo.  
Decades of rule from Yugoslavia/Serbia and establishment of 
international administration in Kosovo; the negotiation process led by the 
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General; the transition phase marked by the 
standards set by the international community with significant 
achievements; were additional points on which the international 
community based their recognition of Kosovo. Achievements on the state-
building, establishment of democratic institutions, its close cooperation and 
compliance with the proposal offered by the UN special envoy and its 
inclusion in Kosovo’s Constitution, the developing of the process of 
decentralization and the issue of respecting and cultivating the cultural 
heritage and human rights are the reasons on which Kosovo bases its call 
for more recognitions.  
Kosovo's independence is accepted by the majority of its population as a 
compromise between being part of Serbia and the union with Albania, as 
rational one, contributing to regional stability. The EU must facilitate the 
process of recognition of Kosovo and speed up Kosovo’s integration into 
Euro-Atlantic organizations/mechanisms to prevent interferences and 
interests from outside of Europe. As starting steps by the non-recognizers 
may be the opening of channels of contacts between civil societies, 
academia, media coverage of the Kosovo issue, public diplomacy activism, 
opening the offices which will coordinate cultural or (and) economic ties, 
recognize Kosovo travel documents. The admission in the regional 
political, economic, education, health, cultural and sporting events or 
organizations will impact on increasing tolerance.  
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The uniqueness of the Kosovo case could be accepted and settled 
through EU integration, which will contribute to real peace in the Kosovo-
Serbian relations as well as EU and regional security. The course of EU 
foreign policy toward Kosovo should be that of a long-term peace-building 
solution.  
Ignoring the existence and not recognizing Kosovo’s statehood by the 
rest of EU countries and the remaining UN members are increasing 
potential for further destabilization of the region, undesirable for the 
Albanian majority population in Kosovo. At the same time, a policy of 
ambiguity and maintaining the hopes for returning Kosovo into Serbia are 
counterproductive. Talks facilitated by EU and determination not to block 
each other’s progress on their EU and other organization membership are 
promising.  
Refusing of Kosovo’s earned sovereignty will raise the chances for 
Russian impact and for religious-affiliated organizations to take as much as 
possible ground in the fragile Balkan region, reorienting the process of 
peace-building in the wrong direction. This policy is sending wrong 
message to political and religious radicals looking for other solutions rather 
than being part of the EU. Dissonant voices on the Kosovo issue coming 
from the EU indicate a lacking unified foreign policy within complex 
supranational organization democracy. Domestic ethnic claims within non-
recognizing countries prevail over the issue of recognizing Kosovo, and 
respect for international law is only rhetorical justification. 
Also, the non-recognition policy of five EU member states cannot help 
Serbia’s integration path and does not amount to concern for the people of 
Serbia. Kosovo’s and Serbia’s interdependent integration course and 
prosperity should not be a victim of such un-harmonized voices within the 
EU. Kosovo is showing matured capacity entering into international 
relations. It depends to the willingness of 5 EU non-recognized countries if 
the new European state could grow within a democratic environment or be 
a victim of antidemocratic ideologies and policies coming from the East. 
To almost absolute ethnic Albanian homogeneity in Kosovo, comprising 
95 per cent of its population, the highest in the region, should be allowed to 
determine their own destiny. Ethnic cleansing and atrocities by Serbia did 
not leave alternatives for the Kosovo people other than that of 
independence, as a logical result of the end of the Cold War in this part of 
Europe. It is the time that myths and legends must not lead modern 
development policies that Kosovo is special case and its independence 
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should be treated as a last resort. Kosovo is a State, because it meets all the 
international legal criteria for statehood, even functioning under internal 
and external pressures and challenges. Further postponing of 5 EU States’ 
willingness to enter into official relations with a new created State of 
Kosovo may produce presented negative outcomes.  
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